On the Difficulty of Our Education from the Vantage of Child Psychoanalysis and its Time of Controversies

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Let us try to think of a different time, where arguments over the nature, timing, and goals of education were highly disputed, not just because there must be contentious views on what we imagine when we imagine education, but, more pointedly, because these debates were on the verge of articulating an unasked question: can education and freedom meet? And let us try to narrate this story in an uncanny time, moving back and forth between then and now, here and there, absence and presence. Think, then, of this other history as proposing an allegory for our own. Then, try to keep open a different sense of ‘time out’: Can we freely associate and still call what we are doing education?

Between 1942-1944, a series of “Extraordinary Meetings” occurred in the British Psychoanalytical Society in London over what would be the future directions of child psychoanalysis. The integrity of the Society would also become part of the stakes because a crucial decision members would face was whether one Society could hold different and clashing theoretical orientations to psychoanalytic practice. This crisis of knowledge, now known as The Freud-Klein Controversies¹, took its name from the key protagonists involved: Melanie Klein and Anna Freud.² Out of the “Extraordinary Meetings,” the Society organized a series of Controversial Discussions which were meant to explore the theoretical divergences between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud. The British Psychoanalytical Society’s Controversial Discussions debated a key tension that educational institutions know well: whether its internal workings could tolerate its own scientific differences or, just as crucially, the difficulties offered by its theory, practice, and training. And the topic that haunts the participants, in ways that continue to stun, concerns how psychoanalytic practice can think the directions, timing, evidence, force, and goals of education for both adults and children. For anyone interested in the promise and perils of education, a large question these Controversies leave us with is: What then is education that it should give us such trouble?

In this paper, I try and tell something of how these Controversies became so controversial—then and now—not just for the history of child
analysis it recounts but also for what we might think about in our own history of education. “The Freud/Klein Controversies” are one of the most documented touchstones in the development of child psychoanalysis. I think this is the case for two reasons. First, the Controversies leave us with precocious questions: Where does misery come from and where does freedom come from? What is the status of aggression and negativity in psychical life? What is the relation between external and internal events and between phantasy and reality? And crucially, if these are our concerns, what can education even mean? And second, the Controversies return the question of what psychoanalytic knowledge is—how it is made, justified, argued over, and experienced—a question that we would do well to ask of our own educational knowledge. For the sake of these reasons, let us turn our attention to the status and boundaries of epistemology and ontology in questions of learning and teaching. Jacqueline Rose (1993) puts the dilemma boldly: “if knowledge borders on fantasy, fantasy is always in part fantasy about (the borders of) knowledge.” She then goes on to revise old questions relevant to any endeavour of life: “Where does the possibility of knowledge come from? Can we conceive of a limit point where it ceases to be?” (Rose 1993, 174). And, in conceiving such a limit, say, of thinking knowledge and phantasy as no longer opposed, where then does the possibility of education emerge and when does it cease to be?

The force of these traumatic conflicts in terms of the Controversial Discussions is tied to earlier events, suggesting the uncanny time of trauma, what Sigmund Freud termed, Nachträglichkeit, a sense of time that returns and revises old events by way of new encounters and may remind us of our own uneven development; that it takes two estranged stories to make one experience. Julia Kristeva (Kristeva 2001, 69) puts the narrative dilemma of duration this way: “We must tell the story of our life, then, before we can ascribe meaning to it.” When Ernest Jones founded the British Psychoanalytical Society in 1919, its first problem was one of membership. In her history of the Controversial Discussions, Pearl King narrated the founding problem as one of education: “Who were appropriate people to be members of a psychoanalytic society and what basic theories should they hold?” (King 1991, 11). This sense of education tries to address how a profession legitimises itself, justifies its internal authority, and lends continuity for itself over time. But if settled too quickly, if asked too soon, membership requirements assume individuals come to a profession already formed and foreclose the very problem of where theory comes from and how education undergoes its own vicissitudes despite the theories held. If the question emerges from a certain anxiety over whether education can settle the problem of trying to know in advance the knowl-
edge required, its answers will also repeat the force of the very anxiety that delivered the initial question. We will meet this dynamic by way of letter exchanges.

By 1927, the debates over technique and theory in child analysis between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud had already heated up and were argued over in the Freud/Jones correspondence (Paskauskas 1993). In a vitriolic exchange of letters beginning in the spring of 1927, Ernest Jones wrote to Freud about Melanie Klein’s pioneering work with children. She had just immigrated to London from Berlin a year earlier and was welcomed into the British Psychoanalytical Society. While Jones knew of the rivalry between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, in a letter to Freud he attempted to defend Klein’s work, telling Freud that Anna Freud’s work with children was immature and stemmed from an incomplete analysis, or in Jones’s words, “imperfectly analyzed resistances” (No. 502, p.617). This comment brought out Freud’s wrath, since he had analysed his daughter. Freud’s first response is measured and distanced; he would rather see Science settle disputes over the veracity of knowledge. But he was also chagrined over how disputes within psychoanalysis were reduced to the analysis of the analyst’s personal flaws:

When two analysts have differing opinions on some point, one may be fully justified, in ever so many cases, in assuming that the mistaken view of one of them stems from his having been insufficiently analysed, and he therefore allows himself to be influenced by his complexes to the detriment of science. But in practical polemics such an argument is not permissible, for it is at the disposal of each party, and does not reveal on whose side the error lies. We are generally agreed to renounce arguments of this sort, and, in the case of differences of opinion, to leave resolutions to advancements in empirical knowledge (No. 503, p.619).

Jones breaks this rule again and in his next letter insisted that his observations were not about “practical polemics” but were “private and personal” (No. 504, p.620). A few letters later, Freud recounts one of the first paper fights between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. He worries that his daughter’s work is not being published in London because of Klein’s influence. His anger is directed at Jones’s earlier insistence that Anna Freud’s work suffers from her “incomplete analysis.” Leaving the third person, Freud breaks his own rule when he writes to Jones on September 23, 1927:

In London you are organizing a regular campaign against Anna’s child analysis, accusing her of not having been analysed deeply enough, a
reproach that you repeat in a letter to me. I had to point out to you that such a criticism is just as dangerous as it is impermissible. Is anyone actually analysed enough? I can assure you that Anna has been analysed longer and more thoroughly than, for example, you yourself (No. 508, p.624).

Steiner’s (1993) view of this exchange reaches the heart of the dispute, not in terms of who is analysed best, as if this question was beyond analysis, but in terms of the difficult knowledge of psychoanalysis itself.

One can grasp almost physically the impossibility of distinguishing clearly, or rather distinguishing absolutely, between the mixture of epistemological, personal, and emotional elements in play in the defense of certain principles in the field of psychoanalysis. It is as if the unconscious as an object of research were taking its revenge, making its presence felt as the subject, impossible to control with any assurance (Steiner 1993, xxxix).

And without any assurance on how psychical processes are enacted in research, since indeed, the concept of the unconscious breaks open the wishes to assure, how then can knowledge advance without being revengeful? We might rework this observation for education as well: defences of educational practices are a strange combination of epistemology, desire, and affective investments in being known and in knowing others. But precisely because of these elements, indeed, the mix up of phantasy and reality when trying to understand what knowledge can mean for the self and other, education cannot be mastered. And herein begins the trouble.

My emphasis is on what led up to the Controversies and how these events can be used as an occasion to consider our own controversies of knowledge, research, and authority in education. This is because the Controversies spanned the gamut of education. One dimension magnified affective relations between adults in professional education and how their disputes affected the formation of schooling for analysts. A second dimension concerned the question of how to think education as a relation of authority between children and adults. However, rather than begin with the assumption of what children need or even what they should know and then expect authority as an answer, the adult’s wish for education took centre stage and so, authority became unhinged from consciousness. A third dimension raised the problem of affective breakdowns within institutional education and whether, for instance psychoanalytic theory could intervene in the very structure of its own education. Finally, there was the querulous couple of knowledge and pedagogy, animated by the questions of what invokes the desire to learn or not learn at all. The unasked question was, how does knowledge become insight as opposed to

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revenge or compliance? These four dimensions of education, in our own time, have been foreclosed by the testing industry, zero tolerance policies, industry measures of accountability, and, the reduction of knowledge to information and its technologies. The consequences of such reductive measures have been severe: the denial of freedom, the insufficiency of sex education and creative responses to our time of AIDS, the ending of the grace of a second chance and the unasked question, indeed, the forgetting of pedagogical conditions that might allow learning its surprises and free associations, and schooling a more interesting transformation.

As I will try to illustrate, the Freud/Klein Controversies offer us a way to rethink crucial dilemmas by beginning at the beginning, so to say: with the problem of distinguishing reality and phantasy in education and then, over what constitutes the adequacy of educational claims to know itself and others. I read these disputes as a story of terminable and interminable education and, so, work the differences between institutional education, where time is linear, chronological, and ordered and where relationships are pre-programmed, and that of existential learning, where recursive time urges meaning in unanticipated, belated, and incomplete ways. A different way of posing the dilemma is to consider just what the gap between knowledge and its realization can mean in and for the education of adults who then return to educate other adults and children and youth. This aporia of knowledge and realization is acute in professional education where theories and practices take on rather urgent formulations and demands, and where failure in education waives between the poles of blaming educators and blaming students or their families; a breakdown of authority reminiscent of the Freud/Jones debate. So, how can we think about the relation between the structure and edifices of education and the knowledge we make of those structures, ideas and people? Which experiences come to count as learning and how do they measure up to formal theories of development? How are the stage and the staging of education both influenced by and susceptible to participants’ unconscious phantasies and kernels of historical truth? Just as the Controversies argued over the differences between adult and child analysis, this conflict is carried over to education: what are the differences between, say, the educator’s education and that of the children? When is education ever complete?

Educational Issues
The psychoanalytic theories of Melanie Klein and Anna Freud were derived from their work with children, their attempts to listen to the child’s symptoms, their innovation and conservation of Freud’s thought, and, perhaps just as significantly, their own self-analysis. At times, their respective writings seem to shadow each other; both wrote about school
phobias, reading difficulties, children who bully others or are subject to being attacked, children who lose things, including their intellectual curiosity, problems of precocity and sexuality, and physical expressions of anxiety such as stuttering, tics, night terrors, and tantrums. They heard in the strange utterances of their young analysands as they played, complex emotional dramas. Over the course of their long careers, they would wrestle with ordinary symptoms that were not, during their time, given over to children: unhappiness, suffering, depression, and feelings of loneliness, being unwanted, and being unloved. And precisely because their objects of research were so elusive—made up from dreams, play, drawings, fantasy, inchoate longings, and even arguments with their young analysands—they both worked extremely hard to establish the validity of their interpretive claims. What made this labour so difficult was that the affective experiences they explored belonged, as we will see, not just to the children they saw; both women also wrestled with these very human dilemmas in their own lives and confronted these affects yet again when trying to convince others of their theory’s relevance. Thus, from the beginning of their research and practice, the boundaries between objective and subjective knowledge were permeable and made even more so by the trade in accusations over whose theory was more loyal to that of Sigmund Freud and, second, whether either of their theories preordained the very symptoms that the practice purported to cure. This second difficulty, a common criticism in education as well, also issued from the disparities between what Klein and Anna Freud claimed for the child. The biggest claim concerned their different senses of the poesies of psychical life and the dilemmas we must encounter to become human.

While both women began with an acknowledgement of the utter dependency of the immature human and how this dependency is a structuring condition of psychical life and relations with others, their research strategies and the consequences each of them drew from this dependency diverged. Klein, for example, felt that the primal distress made from not knowing, what Freud called Hilflosigkeit, enraged and frustrated the infant to such an extent that this anxiety and aggression marked every moment of development. Anna Freud did not attribute to the infant such a formative aggression or sadism and felt the ego’s gradual development, with the aid of its mechanisms of defence, was adept at learning to sublimate instinctual conflict and so, be addressed by the demands of external reality. Indeed, when it came to the life of the child, Anna Freud argued that the child was most influenced by the external world. This insistence spoke to the profound difference between how each considered what the conditions of external reality and internal fantasies mean for a child’s capacity to tolerate anxiety and frustration and then what it might take to make something creative from this difficult mix up. On the question of
where affects come from, both analysts answered very differently because they had different views on the reasons for the gap between knowledge and its realization, therefore, their clinical use of interpretation diverged significantly. Melanie Klein believed the child could benefit from deep interpretations while Anna Freud felt the child in analysis would benefit more from the analyst’s position as a sort of role model or what she called “ego ideal.” While Anna Freud did not eschew the importance of phantasies for the life of the child, she also held the view, through her theories of the ego’s defence mechanisms, that there were three sources of anxiety: objective, instinctual, and super-ego. For Klein, anxiety was constitutional and only had one source: the death drive.

Melanie Klein’s clinical work with very young children and infants laid the foundations for theories of object relations and for her difficult claim that phantasies structure knowledge of both the inside and outside world. Her insistence upon the primacy of phantasies takes us to a very different understanding of interiority and knowledge. In bracketing the consideration of outside processes and so in trying to isolate the profundity of sadness and desolation, Klein is able to think about how instinctual pushes and defenses against them come too early for the human, even as these processes set the conditions for further development. Not knowing is, for Klein, another way to consider phantasy. These phantasies are there, Klein believed, from the beginning of life and offer, in the words of Juliet Mitchell:

An unconscious commentary on instinctual life and links feelings to objects and creates a new amalgam: the world of imagination. Through its ability to phantasize, the baby tests out, ‘primitively’ thinks about it, its experiences of inside and outside. External reality can gradually affect and modify the crude hypothesis phantasy sets up. Phantasy is both the activity and its products (Mitchell 1998, 23).

This ‘commentary’ is inchoate, pre-verbal, and fragmentary. It represents the baby’s premature attempt to master bodily anxiety, an anxiety that, in Klein’s view, is crude, terrifying, aggressive, and subject to turning back against the subject. And yet, phantasies, however negative, are also the condition from which identification and symbolization emerges because the baby, from the beginning, equates her or his bodily anxiety with objects in the world. Through the infant’s projection of her or his bodily sensations into that first other, ‘meanings,’ or what Klein (1975, 221) called “unreal reality,” chaotically return, but then also have to be defended against and eventually mourned. It was, for Klein, psychical reality that made cognitive processes possible.
Before, during, and after the Controversial Discussions Melanie Klein and Anna Freud would argue—with those in their field and in lectures to the general public—over the aetiology of anxiety, defence, and sublimation. They would privilege different causes because their theories attempted to approximate the material from which psychic experiences and interiority are made: endogenous or exogenous, nature or nurture, biology or culture, reality or phantasy? These are arguments over the conditions of being, indeed over what conditions being prior to its entrance into language and culture, and then, once the human enters into the world, how the world affects being, how being imagines the world. Taken together, their theories offer significant questions for how education can be imagined because each analyst was also concerned with what makes curiosity in the first place, how imagination loses its wonder, and further, how curiosity can become important again. For Klein, the capacity to symbolize begins in anxiety, essentially made from phantasies, and this would set the stage for how the baby uses and tolerates knowledge. There would always be an excess to curiosity, for at least in Klein’s view, curiosity also covers the wish not to know. For Klein, the line between terror and learning is never absolute and education may well act out this confusion. For Anna Freud, curiosity also emerges from instinctual conflict but conflict represents a precursor to the work of reality testing. This means that the uses and tolerances of knowledge have to do with ego development and environmental support and with distinguishing between real angst and internal conflict. Thus, Anna Freud argued that educative measures should be joined with child analysis, for education could offer the child strategies of reality-testing.

Klein, however, felt there was not much difference between adult analysis and child analysis, at least not in terms of the central rule of analysis: free association should structure the analytic session. Essentially, she argued that free association was contrary to the goals of education, as was the allowance of the uninhibited expressions of rage, hatred, and terror that Klein documented so powerfully through her case studies of children. Free association cannot admit loyalty, censorship, or the demands of reality and logic. Nor can its meanings be secured or tested against reality. Free association, allowing anything to come to mind, makes knowledge and phantasies indistinguishable. And it was this indiscretion that her interpretation would try to contain.

And, in a sense that perhaps even Melanie Klein could not admit, she was right about the antagonism of education and free association. When the Controversial Discussions came to the education of analysts, there would be no free association of ideas and schools of thought for either side. While each side could argue passionately over theories of learning
and whether pedagogy would be of use to the analysis of children, when the debates turned to the education of analysts and their training, no comparable argument ensued. It was as though adults had somehow outgrown or even exchanged the nature of their being for compliance to institutional demands. Education for adults was reduced to a certain loyalty toward carrying forth and thus having to defend a school of thought. There was plenty of discussion over the nature of the analytic relation, the goals, timing and activities in child analysis, and the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge. But what was lost, when it came to the education of adults, was the problem of where the adult’s curiosity would come from and how theory emerges from the strangely singular encounter of the analytic session.

These problems of imagination and theory are intractable because in the education of professionals it is difficult to pry apart learning ideas from learning authority. There are always tensions among trying to learn how to practice, proving one’s competence in spite of having to learn, and generalizing the unique encounter to situations that defy prediction. This volatile combination of anticipation and retrospection places at odds two sorts of authority: the authority of ideas and the authority of the learner. How does authority transfer from one site to another? The tension becomes catastrophic, however, if institutional design cannot acknowledge this paradox (Safouan 2000). But secondly, institutional disavowal of the conflict that inaugurates thinking about practice in the first place also plays out intimately in an individual’s education. Then the problem is, why is it so difficult to acknowledge the tensions and conflict in one’s own education? Is there something reminiscent about professional education that brings us back to earlier episodes of learning authority and the work of making knowledge adequate?

The difficulty of determining once and for all the difference between adults and children in terms of the time of learning is repeated in the dissonant and uneasy place of education in psychoanalytic thought. Sometimes education refers to child rearing; sometimes it refers to didactic inculcation of rigid morality; sometimes education marks the larger social’s disavowal of conflict and the difficulties of life; and, at other times, it is compared to authoritarianism that was thought to be the source of repression. In the early history of child analysis, a more positive sense of education linked the exchange of ignorance for knowledge to becoming enlightened, placing education close to the Kantian Aufklärung, reasonable knowledge that can be put into service for the dual purpose of curing ignorance and repression and becoming reflective. As for the first purpose, a rather vicious tautology was thus put into place: education causes repression and is the cure for repression. If such a defin-
ition foreclosed the question of where repression comes from by placing it solely in social processes and ignoring psychical demands, there was still the problem of why education as social engineering is resisted. As for the second purpose, the work of becoming reflective raised the very problem of what might count as cure: consciousness cannot guarantee its own transparency because reason cannot escape psychical dynamics or its own dream work such as distortion, displacement, deferral, substitution, repression, and turning into its opposite. If reason seems to carry its own justifications, it must also defend against that which resists justification, namely the unconscious.

Yet more than once Freud called education one of the impossible professions and by this he meant a double impossibility. One concerned the problem of why knowledge is often resisted and how phantasies exert more persuasive power and pressure over judgement than does reality. The other impossibility was directed to the work of educating: those who practice as educators must struggle with the inherent difficulty of trying to persuade individuals to change the ways they think, believe, and work. This places educator’s efforts fairly close to that of the cajoling or punishing parents and their functions of authority. In other words, relations of authority are caught in dynamics of desire: desire for learning, learning for love, and desiring to both be and have the authority knowledge bestows. What is impossible is the idea that education occurs without trouble. Along with this seemingly pessimistic view, Freud also put great faith in the possibility that knowledge can help individuals construct insight, support thoughtfulness, work through neurosis, and prepare their own way for love of ideas. He felt that learning from knowledge of psychical reality, a knowledge that must be made retrospectively, might allow individuals to suffer differently and, over the course of their lives, ask themselves to create ever new answers to the interminable life question of what happiness and unhappiness can mean. And while it seems as though Freud would like to have education in these two contradictory ways, as both resistance and as insight, Pontalis argues that there is no contradiction to such an approach: “One must indeed encourage parents and educators not to lie to children, not to answer with ‘childish sayings,’ in other words with myths concocted by adults for children, but one must not expect such knowledge to replace the unconscious” (1981, 96).

Does such ambivalence over the uses of knowledge and that which resists its use work in the analyst’s education as well? Pontalis’s discussion of the stakes of learning to become an analyst suggests the ambivalence has more to do with the very processes psychoanalytic theory tries to clarify than its actual knowledge: “Psychoanalytic theory harbours the very mechanisms which bring it to light: resistance, repression, distortion, dis-
placement, repetition etc” (1981, 106). The use of knowledge, then, is not a problem of application but rather, of constructing narratives and understanding something about their affective resonances for the self and other. This expressive drama structures psychoanalytic education. It also is a key dilemma for teacher education, where the pressure to apply ideas shuts out consideration of why we feel we must rush to learn or even try to catch learning within the parenthesis of ‘teachable moments.’

As with learning to teach, psychoanalytic training is organized by its apprenticeship and is made from two different kinds of knowledge that are assumed to be at odds: practical and theoretical. The actual experience of being analysed is a significant part of one’s analytic education and not only because it distinguished the analyst from those who practiced what Freud (1910) called, when he founded the International Psychoanalytic Association, “wild analysis.” In conceptualising how one learns from the practices of psychoanalysis, that is, how one becomes an analyst, Freud placed a tension at the heart of the analyst’s education, making sure they respected the gap between knowing about psychoanalysis and being analysed, between intellectualisation and becoming oneself. It is a demand, for both education and psychoanalysis, that must be learned over and over. In Eigen’s more contemporary view, “Psychoanalytic experience is not the same as knowing about it. Patient and analyst are faced with the problem of passing from the wish to ‘know thyself, accept thyself, be thyself’ to becoming the reality such words suggest. There is a gap between knowing about x and being x” (1997, 213). And in some sense, education as a method should not and indeed cannot fill that gap. Yet the contemporary field of education takes a different view: there shall be a meeting of theory and practice, and it shall be experienced as one learns to teach. From an analytic vantage, the very conflict that inaugurates knowledge is foreclosed in the idealized couple of theory and practice.

Experiencing an analysis was a prerequisite for the work of analysing others, but by the time of the Controversies, the meaning of the analysis for education threatened to break apart under the weight of the question of whether this training analysis should be aligned with a particular school of thought. This was a deeply personal issue because one’s own analysis is the heart of one’s practice and any outside criticism is a very delicate matter. But also, education for the analyst had two warring dimensions: theoretical knowledge of the unconscious and subjective or idiomatic knowledge of the self through one’s own analysis. For these dimensions to be meaningful rather than be placed into a hierarchy of value, they must, by nature, be thought of and encountered as at odds. It could be a productive tension if it could allow for a different sort of listening practice, capable of reading, as Freud put it, “between the lines of
[the analysand’s] complaint and the story of his illness” (1913, 140). Part of the Controversies was a vehement argument over what complaints might signify to the analysands and the analyst and where the place of education might figure: within the nature of the complaint or somewhere in the story of illness?

The Controversies over education invoked a sort of splitting between, on the one side, good education from bad education and, on the other side, bad education from worse education. This gradient is not so easily communicated because of a necessary entanglement of morality with autonomy and of knowledge with desire. Some of the difficulty emerges because education is never, at least in analytic terms, solely a rational affair and thus cannot secure itself through rational persuasion or better planning. Indeed, these very methods are not outside of anxiety. How does one distinguish absolutely rational education from irrational education? Another part of the difficulty is that the Controversies placed at stake both the education of the adult analyst and that of the child analysands. If education vacillates between the wishes of the adult and the desires of the child, if the knowledge promised could neither meet the demand to know nor insure the capacity to believe, then how does one consider the directionality of influence and susceptibility? The problem is that at times, the Controversies tried to foreclose the dilemmas education represents because the debates acted out something agonizing about the frontiers of education itself: education is made and broken somewhere between reality and phantasy. One part of the debate intensified the question of whether educative goals should or even could become the key that unlocks the analysis of children. Another part occupied the education of analysts, but, there, reduced education to its most rigid: didactic training and course work. The literal question of how to think about the differences between child and adult analysis returned to the education of the analyst: what can theoretical conflict mean for the analysts’ education?

There is a certain irony in this split, for while some of the arguments had to do with which psychical and social conflicts children experienced, when it came to adult education, part of the desire was to eliminate conflictive views from the adult’s experience. Whereas the tensions of education are stressed in the first instance of child analysis, when it came to the training of analysts, education was reduced to an answer to the question of which theory and which practice shall dominate training. Both sides did grapple with how education influences not just the learner but also the imperatives of the teacher. However, while education in child analysis was admitted as a danger (as both inhibition and sublimation), when it came to the education of the analysts, the danger lost its constitutive power. Or, so it seemed.
Theory Wars
While the Controversies offer insight into the large question of what can or should constitute educative efforts in analysis and in the training of analysts, a comparable debate occupies the humanities, social sciences, and sciences. These present debates include the following: the positions one might take in relation to knowledge, the adequacy of curriculum, the future of academic training, and, the status of theoretical knowledge in relation to experience, world relating, empiricism, and transformations of its subjects. Within each problem, we can find disagreements over whether education should be on the side of affirmation or destruction, whether education should be personal or impersonal, and whether education should provide role models or neutrality. As in the Controversies, all of these debates question the purpose, conditions, and veracity of education, not just in terms of the present but also in terms of the imagined future of our ideas. Whereas many contemporary discussions characterize debates in the field of education as ‘the culture wars,’ and these wars include conceptualising and altering material practices of inequality and relations of power, and, in some basic sense, stabilizing knowledge relations between identity and politics, I want to offer another sort of dilemma that has to do with the fantasy of knowledge: theory wars, or clashes in how the world is encountered and represented.

Theory wars consist of disputes over human nature, problems of generalization and singularity, and arguments between theory and practice. Taking sides, becoming rigid in explanations, refusing to consider internal contradictions within schools of thought, and personalizing the stakes suggest some of the symptoms of theory wars. Other symptoms are contemporary: searching for binary oppositions without a theory of binary operations, tracking down ideologies without a view of the uses of illusion, worrying whether arguments are won or lost on essentialist or constructivist grounds, and avoiding our own implication in knowledge. Theory wars express our elusive desire or urge for knowledge, what Melanie Klein (1930) called “the epistemophilic instinct.” Here, the unconscious question might be, following Rose (1993): where does theoretical knowledge come from?

Otto Kernberg offers some of the consequences of refusing this precocious question in education. In “Thirty Methods to Destroy the Creativity of Psychoanalytic Candidates,” his second method states: “It is important for the instructor to keep in mind that it is the conclusions that Freud arrived at that have to be taught and memorised, not the process of Freud’s thinking…” (1996, 1032). When education is reduced to its most didactic form, when the curriculum forecloses the learner’s capacity to
argue with it, and when knowledge itself is reduced to zero tolerance, the possibility of doubting the knowledge proffered is diminished and, ironically, knowledge within the curriculum can never possess any authority. What can it mean to think through, or work through, education, not from the vantages of its certainties or the edifice of its claims, but from the point of view of its vulnerabilities, questions, and, to borrow from Roy Schafer's observation on the problem of constructing evidence, from the vantage of its “inherent ambiguity” (1994, 361)? Part of the inherent ambiguity of thinking has to do with how difficult it is to separate the desire for knowledge from the pleasure of knowing and, then, from the aggressive compulsion to protect and save the knowledge made. This is the underside of Klein’s epistemophilic instinct: the drive to know cannot distinguish the difference between knowing a thing and taking possession of it.

So far, many of my observations are applicable to a range of academic fields. Recent studies on epistemology suggest, to put it bluntly, that a field without controversies is a dead field (Dosse, 1999; Herrnstein-Smith, 1997). It is generally accepted that knowledge proceeds by breakdown, but there are some unique qualities within psychoanalysis that allow for consideration of resistance to learning or just how difficult it is to learn from the breakdown of meaning and our desires to know. Unlike arguments in the fields of human science, and education in particular, which try to ally themselves most closely to their own reality principal, the specific debates within psychoanalysis reside on the borderline of the pleasure principal and that which lies beyond. Psychoanalysis is, for the most part, not only made from a theory of conflict, elaborated most severely over the course of the most devastating wars of the twentieth century. But just as significantly, its practices depend upon the practitioner’s practical and theoretical understanding of how its theories can say something about her or his own unconscious wishes for the self and other. In other words, psychoanalytic objects of research, such as neuroses, psychoses, anxieties, resistance, affects, and defences, also fashion the interiority of the researcher (Steiner 1985).¹⁰

Admitting the practitioner’s susceptibility to the very objects of her or his practice is rather different from other claims on the use of empathy in fields like education and anthropology.¹¹ At their best, these fields depend upon the researcher’s capacity for verstehen, or understanding tied to the desire to know. But understanding is projected outside toward social processes and not turned inward toward encountering the difficulties congealed in the problem of what satisfies or provokes the desire to understand and be understood. Here, we encounter a very different conceptualization of theory, namely the unconscious. For example, in the
work of teaching, we can identify a defensive move, what Gardner calls “the furor to teach” (1994, 3). But it is extremely rare to consider this as a problem of defending against one’s own helplessness in the face of the other, or as tied to one’s subjective history of learning and its disappointments. Within psychoanalytic practices, the concept of transference, for example, references and confronts the problem of boundaries not just between self and other but between illness and health and judgment and perception (Mannoni 1999), and these vacillations render theory and practice as a struggle between reality and phantasy. In her paper on technique submitted to the Society during the Controversies, Marjorie Brierley (1943, 619) spoke about “the spur of therapeutic anxiety,” a sort of collusion with the pain made from the analyst’s attempt to relate to the suffering of others and still experience resistance to her own unconscious helplessness. That psychoanalysis knows conflict so well, that it flourishes by argumentation, that its practices expect resistance, deflection, disavowal, and acting out, for example, on the part of analysands and analysts through the transference and the counter-transference suggests that, at least theoretically, institutions of psychoanalysis should be capable of encountering breakdowns in meanings in ways that do not repeat the breakdown. Moreover, while this theoretical hope is tied to the wish that there might be collegiality in spite of disagreement and that psychoanalytic institutions can learn to tolerate internal frustration, the history of psychoanalysis is made from clashes of theory and practice: whether and how psychoanalysis can affect its own institutional imaginary. This question also haunts the historicity of education, that is, whether and how education can affect its own institutional imaginary.

Child Analysis before “The Controversies”
Child analysis has always had its controversies, not just from those looking in who continue to express a strange combination of horror and incredulity toward psychoanalytic claims about childhood conflict, sexual researching, and infantile sexuality. The claims being made in the name of the child were startling: children suffered, lived a complex inner world, thought about sexuality without any help from education, and were susceptible to their own libidinal and aggressive drives. And while this outside incredulity was not surprising—after all, psychoanalysts expect resistance—psychoanalytic communities were also ambivalent about the directions, influence, and training of child analysts. The actual child presented a significant dilemma to one of the goals of adult analysis: reconstruction of the repressed past in terms of its present repetitions. Were children capable of transferential relations with the analyst when the child’s actual authority figures—the parents—were still central in the
child’s life? How could the child reconstruct the past before it could even be established? Or, just how archaic is psychical conflict? Was the child even capable of free association? And yet, the child also presented a possibility for the curative power of psychoanalysis: the early working through of neurosis may allow for a better, more insightful adulthood.

Hermine Hug-Hellmuth is credited with sketching out the foundations of child analysis. Her 1920 paper, “On the technique of child-analysis,” began with a set of cautions that urged analysts to distinguish child analysis from its adult counter-point. In Hug-Hellmuth’s view, the analyst must be the child’s advocate, work to “break the ice,” and establish rapport by asking for the child’s help. The analyst was also to construct the content of play, supplying the child with scenarios that would form the basis of the child’s talk. These scenarios were to address the child’s conscious perceptions, and the analyst must be cautious in offering interpretations. Mainly, the analyst was to reassure the child of her or his goodness, thus linking self-esteem and confidence building to the problem of undoing neurosis. Two years after Freud’s (1926) call for child analysis to have an educative value, Hug-Hellmuth defined the nature of that value: “The curative and educative work of analysis does not consist only in freeing the young creature from his sufferings, it must also furnish him with moral and aesthetic values” (1926, 138). This view put child analysis in the developmental service of Aufklärung. And while, at least in the beginning, Melanie Klein adhered to this view on education, her own son’s analytic education suggested that educative measures were not sufficient to the prevention of neurosis and intellectual inhibition. Indeed, the scary idea that Klein would try to confront is that educative measures suffered from these very symptoms: something within education can make us nervous.

How did Melanie Klein come to leave behind her earlier faith in educative measures and shift her practice from analytic education to psychoanalysis? The same year that Hug-Hellmuth gave her paper on the techniques of child analysis, Klein’s own technique began to question the dominant suppositions of Hug-Hellmuth and Anna Freud. For them, anxiety developed from external circumstances; guilt and moral anxiety occurred late in the child’s development because Oedipal anxieties were a later development. This meant that psychoanalysis must be closely allied with didactic education, opening some choices for the child, but foreclosing others. Originally, like Anna Freud, Melanie Klein held a strong belief in the curative process of knowledge for character development and for liberating intellectual inhibitions. Her first case study, reported to the Budapest Society in 1919 and one that served as her admittance into the Society, described her progress with her own child—Erich’s—psychoana-
lytic education. There, she claimed that in answering Erich’s questions honestly and by urging him to give up his religious illusions and superstitious explanations of sex by offering him accurate knowledge, Erich would be able to free his intellectual inhibitions. But Erich remained unsatisfied with his mother’s rational explanations, and, in the face of rational knowledge, he continued to prefer his phantasies. His symptoms of running away from home, even at a very early age, were not broken by rational information. Moreover, Erich refused to believe the information offered and so, he stopped asking questions.

Petot’s study of Melanie Klein’s early theories, suggest the psychoanalytic problem:

. . . on the first occasion the approach to the unconscious was only a means toward a project of elitist pedagogy in the context of an ideology very near to that of the Aufklärung, the rationalist philosophy of enlightenment, critical spirit, free thought, and the rejection of authority and religion. In Melanie Klein’s real practice, this ideology served as the rationalization of a narcissistic approach to Erich (1990, 33).

Just as Melanie Klein asked Erich to leave his illusions behind, she herself would have to change not just her philosophical hopes for the power of rationality to liberate inhibitions but also the cultural desires that rendered her approach so ideological in its faith toward the curative effects of knowledge. Significantly, Klein’s narcissism was also at stake: first as a mother who wished for omnipotence over the child’s development, then as a teacher who wished to master the mysteries of how the child learns, and finally as an analyst who wishes to solve suffering through interpretation. And yet, narcissism is not the full story, for Klein’s attention to Erich’s intellectual inhibition was also tied to her own struggles to be recognized as a thinker and to free herself from her history of intellectual constraint (Likierman 2001). In this sense, Klein’s move from a psychoanalytic education to a psychoanalysis was also a working through, a mourning for what is lost when education is ostensibly found.

A comment offered by Anton von Freund after her paper, while originally dismissed, slowly affected her rethinking and her own self-analysis. He suggested that her work with Erich was not yet, in its interventions, psychoanalytic. While Klein’s initial rule was only to answer Erich’s direct questions and provide him with specific amounts of information, von Freund argued that a true psychoanalytic education would “take into account ‘unconscious questions’ and reply to them” (Petot 1990, 28–29). He also offered practical advice: Klein must distinguish her parental relations from the analytic ones, and set up formal times for analysis. It
would be the more difficult insistence of von Freund that would distinguish Klein from her peers. To reply to unconscious questions, Klein would have to analyse Erich's phantasies, and this shift in the psychoanalytic object, from the child's conscious occupations to the unconscious anxiety, meant that her understanding of the child, the nature of knowledge, and psychoanalytic cure would also change in dramatic ways. In the case of the child, it would be phantasies that inaugurate development. In the case of the psychoanalytic encounter, Klein would leave her desire to mould the child's character and so abandon educational goals for the less certain free association. And finally, as for the question of knowledge, it would no longer be on the side of enlightenment: epistemology would be brought closer to anxiety and phantasies. Petot's summary of Klein's new position still startles:

The child's good social adaptation and success at school cannot be the goals for the child analyst; they are at most secondary... "normality" cannot be stated in terms of objective criteria, but in terms of liberty, fluidity, and variety in the creation of fantasies.... No reference to external criteria can be acceptable in psychoanalysis.... The first lesson of Erich's education may be stated in the following terms: the objectives of the analysis of children can be defined only in psychoanalytic terms (1990, 44).

Psychoanalytic cure meant the freeing of phantasy, not rationality. Anna Freud (1936) would come to know this tension when she noted one of the ego's mechanisms of defense as "intellectualization." But Klein's change signified a radical reconsideration of normality and knowledge through the making of psychoanalytic knowledge and through the strange measure of liberty and creativity. And because Klein felt education could not support this reconsideration, it became irrelevant.

Education was not the only processes set aside. Klein felt that appeals to either rapport or to external reality in the analytic session would be of no use. Nor could external conditions and the analysts' nurturing qualities provide any solace for how interpretation might do its work. Klein had thus moved from the question of how the world influenced the child's development to how the child encountered and created the world of object relations. In that move, she threw away any appeal to the impartial person that Freud (1926) created in his defense of lay analysis and raised a significant dilemma for our theories about knowledge: What are the boundaries and limits of education? Because of Klein's approach, there will be a respect in child analysis for a gap between "the appearance of objective knowledge or savoir-faire and its translation into the sphere of object relations; in short between simple knowing and realization. It is
this gap which is filled by the working through process” (Petot 1991, 123). This gap is also the one that Freud placed at the heart of psychoanalytic training and learning, one that, by its very nature must inaugurate, however painfully, theory and its wars.

Strong disagreement over how analytic insight could be made was part of the burgeoning disagreement between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. While both analysts utilized play in the analytic setting, their views on how to interpret play, or the symbolic reach of the child’s relation to objects, varied significantly. What analytic scenes were being enacted in the analytic session? And, how does transference work in child analysis?

Anna Freud seemed reticent to affix the child’s play solely to psychical reality or to use the transference as the basis of interpretation. She argued that the child is not yet ready to re-enact new editions of prior love relations because the prior relations are not yet past! Indeed, for Anna Freud, transference was a developmental achievement. Because the child was still in a state of dependency upon the parents, not just in terms of having her or his daily physical needs met but also requiring the parent’s actual presence in the working out of morality, her or his super-ego was also immature. This reasoning led Anna Freud to her insistence that the analyst’s role was one of attempting to offer herself as an ego ideal and as an object of authority. In Anna Freud’s (1927, 65) words, the work of the analyst, “combines in his own person two difficult and diametrically opposed functions: he has to analyze and educate, that is to say, in the same breath he must allow and forbid, loosen and bind again.” This is also the work of the educator, part of the difficult balance that both inaugurates the trouble of education and assuages, perhaps, the force of its experience.

Herein lies the crux of Klein’s argument with Anna Freud: For Melanie Klein, the analysis of unconscious anxiety must and can be readily encountered as the basis of analytic work. The analyst offers neither praise nor blame, only interpretations. As for interpreting the symbolic reach of child play, because the child is so closely allied with unconscious wishes, play, itself a symbolic representation, is not only comparable to free association but its anxiety content is readily observed. There is no prerequisite for analysis because for Klein, when it comes to the unconscious, there is no difference between adults and children and addressing the anxieties that have unconscious origins is the work of analysis. Mrs. Klein, in her critique of Anna Freud’s Introduction to Techniques of Child Analysis13 pinpoints their difference directly: “I believe then that a radical difference between our attitudes to anxiety and a sense of guilt in children is this: that Anna Freud makes use of these feelings to attach the child to herself, while I from the outset enlist them in the service of the analytic
work” (1927, 145). Enlisting anxiety, however, also led to a very different stance of the analyst. Klein argued that the analyst could no longer be an advocate and must adopt a detached stance. She admitted this as a painful insistence: “Analysis is not in itself a gentle method: it cannot spare the patient any suffering, and this applies equally to children” (Original emphasis, 144).

As if to answer some of these criticisms, Anna Freud published “The Theory of Child Analysis (1928 [1927]).” Mrs. Klein is only mentioned once, as someone who works with play technique in the analysis of small children. Like Hug-Hellmuth, Anna Freud emphasizes that the children cannot yet construct their history and the troubles brought to the analytic setting are utterly current and grounded in conflicts with reality. This difference is used to support Anna Freud’s view that the child’s superego is neither archaic nor structured by sadistic phantasies. Rather, it is still being built, so to say, and the materials for its construction are the child’s actual relations to the real parents. In Anna Freud’s view, education must be an intimate experience in the analytic session, for unlike the adult superego that is very difficult to transform without reconstructing their childhood and infantile anxieties, the child is very susceptible to the adult’s influence. Miss Freud (1927, 163) also minimizes Klein’s insistence that education be separated from child analysis by poking at what she saw as Klein’s anxiety: “I do not see why we should be so frightened of this word [education], or regard such a combination of two attitudes as a disparagement of analysis.” Indeed, in Anna Freud’s view, taking education into account allows the analyst to understand the external conditions and events that can also affect internal distress.

Whereas a few years later Anna Freud (1936) would go to great lengths to distinguish between “real angst” or justified anxiety made from dangers in the world and the anxiety that stems from internal conflict, Melanie Klein insisted that anxiety emanates from the poesies of perception and symbolization: it is a reaction to fear of retaliation, an effect of an inaugural confusion between good and bad caused by the imagined violence of object relations that begins at the beginning of life. This anxiety constitutes for Klein, in part, the early super-ego that in turn is subject to its own severe phantasies turned against itself. It is a development that occurs regardless of external conditions. Thus from the beginning, while the super-ego is made from identifications, the identifications are made from partial objects, phantasies. While Anna Freud sees the child’s super-ego as weak and dependent upon real object relations, Melanie Klein views the super-ego as violent, sadistic, and severe. For Klein, the role of the analyst is not to help strengthen this psychical agency but rather to encounter it: “If the analyst, even only temporarily, becomes the
representative of the educative agencies, if he assumes the role of the super-ego, at that point he blocks the way of the instinctual impulses to Cs [Consciousness]: he becomes the representative of the repressive facilities. . . . [Psychoanalysis] must enable [the analyst] to be really willing only to analyze and not wish to mold and direct the minds of his patients” (1927, 167).

This is a position that Melanie Klein would maintain throughout her long career. Her research would begin, however, with a question that, as Pontalis points out, touches both the heart of education and causes its aberrations: “What holds the child back?” (1981, 96). Pontalis suggests that her research into this question makes all the difference to the techniques of child analysis: “The technical debate opposing Melanie Klein to Anna Freud reflects the confrontation of two ethics: for Anna Freud, in the end, it was a question of making the child find the adult’s alleged autonomy; for Melanie Klein, it was a matter of coming to meet the child’s psychic reality and measuring adult knowledge against it, “in the spirit of free and unprejudiced research”” (1981, 96). And yet, the Controversies did not just oppose these two ethics but necessarily repeated their tension. That is, the question of autonomy within a psychoanalytic society was central. But also, along with this was the problem of meeting one’s own psychical reality in one’s theory. One might say that the Controversies were also about the difficulties of free and unprejudiced research in relation to another difficulty, that of acknowledging the problem of being free and then, whether this, too, is a conflict that belongs to education.

Phantasy and Reality, Knowledge and Realization
On September 18, 1933, six years after the difficult exchange between Jones and Freud on the future of child analysis, Jones again broached the topic of conflict within analytic societies. Historical truths precipitated his remarks: a few months before, the death of Ferenczi and across Germany, the Nazi burning of Freud’s books.14 There was also the beginning dispersal into exile of the analytic community,15 the impending Anschluss, and, in previous letters they exchanged, Freud’s deepening depression over whether psychoanalysis would survive Nazi persecution.16 Jones, however, and perhaps sounding very close to Melanie Klein, felt the biggest problem facing psychoanalysis was internal, or “the tendency towards quarrelling and internal dissension in so many societies” (Paskauskas, 729). He offered Freud three reasons why psychoanalysis has not been successful among analysts:

First, that so many were originally neurotic and have chosen the career as a method of holding their neurosis at bay. Secondly, that continued work
All of these reasons are now our nostalgia in contemporary debates that blame educators. Yes, educators, too, suffer from their own education. Yes, education makes us tired. Yes, our education is inadequate. But this road leads us to the realm of aggressive phantasy and an obdurate reality where there is no such thing as learning at all. Arguably, with his third reason Jones returns to the scene of the crime, accusing Freud of not analysing his daughter sufficiently. This strategy is, as André Green suggests recently, all too common and rather tautological: "The analyst’s feelings when confronted with failure can be divided broadly into two categories: paranoia projection (‘it’s the patient’s fault; he was un-analysable’) and depressive self-accusation (‘it’s the fault of the bad analyst who was badly analysed’)") (1999, 101). But there are also, in these observations, glimpses of something more difficult, namely the experience of uncertainty, and of not knowing, the difficulty of both reality and phantasy. On one level, Jones’s reasons could be read as signalling a central problem that inaugurates both the psychoanalytic dialogue and the educational dialogue: how do practices account for their own limits and what can these accounts mean to practitioners? Where do limits come from and what belongs to the subject and what belongs to the world? What is the relation between the inside or the psychical and the outside or the social? How does one know the irrational from the rational? How does one tell the difference between knowledge and its realization? How much of the failure of a project, a theory, or a practice is due to its own internal conflicts and how much is due to outside conditions? Finally, what if education emerges from these very breakdowns of meaning, this very uncertainty?

On another level, there is the story of interminable education, an utterly human endeavour made from the flaws of perception, projection, resistance to knowledge, and yes, even theory. There is something in our education that is radically unknowable and has been named, over the course of my arguments as the gap between knowledge and its realization, between reality and phantasy, between resistance and insight. If we believe Jones, the difficulties of the field can be found within the practitioner’s limits and not the limits of the clients. If we consider Green, then the more difficult question is: How can a profession think within its failures and work through its defences against that which it cannot understand?

Freud, too, would acknowledge this aporia in one of his last papers, “Constructions in Analysis.” There, Freud does not settle this difficulty.
with knowledge. Instead, he illustrates the problem even more, drawing from his well-worn metaphor, archaeology, but now, offering some distinctions between the work of the analyst and the work of the archaeologist:

that psychical objects are incomparably more complicated than the excavator’s material ones and that we have insufficient knowledge of what we may expect to find, since their finer structure contains so much that is still mysterious. But our comparison between the two forms of work can go no further than this; for the main difference between them lies in the fact that for the archaeologist the reconstruction is the aim and end of his endeavours while for analysis the construction is only a preliminary labour (1937, 260).

Regardless of technique, the capacity for the analysands to construct meaning is just the beginning of analytic work. We are back to the place Eigen formulated as “a gap between knowing about x and being x between knowledge and its realization. And we are also facing our own education, our preliminary labour.

“Constructions in Analysis” also suggests something of the divide and the bridge between constructions and historical truths, or what Anna Freud and Melanie Klein have been calling phantasies and reality. Tracing the elegant design of delusions, Freud returns to the poetic view of a method in madness by offering the idea that there resides within madness “a fragment of historical truth” (1937, 267). Just what precisely this truth might be, or what counts as significant, would be the work of the analyst and the analysand. And this construction would only prepare the common ground for them to begin their work. Perhaps such a construction can help us think about resistance to education and how this resistance is also the grounds of education. There is a certain logic in not learning. What complicates this logic is that fragments of historical truth also lie in the gap between knowledge and its realization; that is, the truth of one’s experience, one’s education, will always be a problem. The Freud-Klein Controversies and our own contemporary debates, however, suggest that the kernel of historical truth is not easily found, especially when it seems to be covered over by institutional denials of the troubles that inaugurate practices. Then, the common ground of education seems to collapse from the very weight that constitutes it in the first place, namely the uncanny play of reality and phantasies and the accompanying positions of alliance and detachment.

What then is education that it should give us so much trouble? In his re-reading of Klein’s discussion on Richard, one of her adolescent analysands, Adam Philips (1996, 108) argues that Melanie Klein’s technique of child analysis offers the question from where or whom does the
unconscious come. Klein did not ask this question herself, but her interpretations are sustained by the view that to understand the force of reality one must go directly to the inner world of phantasy, a world that is a profound argument over what becomes of reality when it must pass through object relations and when reality is encountered before it can be known. And yet, the articulation of unconscious phantasy cannot be direct because there are always two questions: To what does play refer? And, then, how much play should interpretation enjoy? From a Kleinian view, we can ask the same of education: from where or whom does education come? Is it in the desire to know or is this desire somehow learned from the other? Is this desire for education on the side of phantasy or reality? And, must we really choose at all?

Anna Freud’s unasked question comes from a different direction: from where and whom does authority come? How can we know if we are taking the side of the child, and when do we leave behind our own insistences and allow for our own gap between knowledge and its realization? These questions are also sustained by her view that to understand the force of phantasy, one must call the ego back to the world of education and that, moving close to Kleinian theory after the Controversies, part of this call must urge reparative forces, not just for the world but for the ego’s relation to knowledge as well. Anna Freud knew that education, even in its most gentle and well intentioned moves, could still be a blow to narcissism, that desire for itself the ego also requires in order to venture out into the world and risk desire for others. Anna Freud is asking education to repair its own harm. What she would also understand, and this she shared with Klein, is that such a repair can only occur after something broke. And this something, we might speculate, could reside either in phantasies or in reality, in knowledge or its realization. This was and is the trouble of education, then and now. Chances are, that something, those fragments of historical truth and that kernel of madness, are what makes education so difficult, subject to aggression and to desires for making reparation. It is also a chance that Freud called working through, and what we might come to risk as a theory of controversial learning that leans toward that difficult liberty the analysts called “free association.”

Notes

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1. Pearl King and Riccardo Steiner edited the papers and discussions that go under the title *The Freud-Klein Controversies, 1941-45*. This edition, running 966 pages, is noteworthy in so many regards: it contains the minutes from the Extraordinary meetings, papers and responses read during the meetings, transcripts of arguments, and memorandums and resolutions from members. King and Steiner's retrospective commentaries draw upon private correspondences and, then, their analytic insight. To give readers a sense of the internecine relations, listen to how analyst Sylvia Payne in a letter to Ernest Jones dated August 1, 1945 described the protagonists:

I think that Anna Freud has several very weak character traits and I am sure that she will not hesitate to try and get what she wants without considering the opinions of those who differ from her. I fancy that her father was the only person who could prevent this, and as she must have taken over Freud's determination to keep psychoanalysis isolated and to allow no one in who has character traits of omnipotence, I cannot see any hope of compromising in any way. Unfortunately, we have the same omnipotence in Melanie [Klein] and this is really why her work has made so much trouble; it is in her personality (Cited in King and Steiner 1991, p. 914).

For a history of child analysis, see Bick, 1987; Geissmann and Geissmann, 1998; Grosskurth, 1987; Rodríguez, 1999; and Young Bruelh, 1988. Both Melanie Klein (1955) and Anna Freud (1966) also wrote brief essays on this history although from the vantage of their respective techniques and perhaps to continue their arguments with one another.

2. The list of participants is impressive and begins Pearl King and Riccardo Steiner's (1991) compilation of the meeting notes and papers. Three schools of thought were represented: The Anna Freudians, the Kleinians, and the Independents (see King and Steiner, pp. xi-xxv). King and Steiner also suggest the main protagonists: "... for scientific purposes, the main argument was between Edward Glover, Melitta and Walter Schmideberg, Willi and Hedwig Hoffe, Barbara Low, Dorothy Burlingham, Barbara Lantos, and Kate Friedlander, who, along with Anna Freud, opposed the new ideas of Melanie Klein, whose main supporters were Susan Isaacs, Joan Riviere, Paula Heinmann, Donald Winnicott, and John Rickman" (p.3).

3. Laplanche and Pontalis (1973, 112) in their entry on "deferred actions" note three characteristics of Nachträglichkeit: an experience that cannot be assimilated into lived experience; a revision of the first event because of a second event, and uneven development. In each of these characteristics there is a secondary working over of an earlier event. The term, "afterwardness" is used by Laplanche (1992).

4. The Freud/Jones Correspondence (Paskauskas, 1993) spanned 1908-1939, until Freud went into exile and joined Jones in London. This correspondence is a touchstone for contemporary discussions of the Klein/Freud Controversies. See, for example, Rose; Stonebridge and Phillips; and Steiner (1985).

5. Grosskurth's (1986, p.172) discussion of this exchange asks the provocative question, "Did Jones suspect that Freud had analyzed Anna?"

6. Free association, letting anything come to mind, makes psychoanalysis very different from other modes of psychology. But it is also, according to Christopher Bollas (1999, 63), a profound critique of epistemology: "To ask Western man to discover truth by abandoning the effort to find it and adopting instead the leisurely task of simply stating what crosses the mind moment to moment is to undermine the entire structure of Western Epistemology." This is so because the boundary between the relevant and irrelevant is no longer at stake, nor is the wish for knowledge to interfere with freely associating.

7. Philosophically, the German word, *Aufklärung* refers to The Enlightenment. But it also means "clearing up, solution, information, and explaining the facts of life to children" (Collins German Concise Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v.). As it was used in the early history of child analysis, education was thought to remove inhibitions and repressions caused by social pressures and adult mythology offered in answering the child's sexual questions. (See also Pontalis, 1981.)
8. Michel Foucault's (1997) discussion of Kant's essay "Was ist Aufklärung" argues that the Enlightenment is best thought of as an attitude, "a way out, an exit" (305) from immaturity rather than a discrete periodicalization of time. A new question Kant asked, "What differences does today introduce with respect to yesterday?" (305) allows for his interest in reason's reconstruction of authority, will, and obligation. This question is also relevant to the analytic session, and supports, as discussed later in my essay, Freud's notion of construction.

9. The epistemophilic instinct was an early theory of Klein's designating the urge or desire to know. What gives this instinct urgency is sexuality and what gives the instinct its aggression is sadism. In Klein's view, for the infant, knowing and taking possession of a thing are synonymous and this relation or symbolic equivalent means that there is a sadistic impulse behind curiosity, made even more cruel because curiosity emerges prior to the acquisition of language and hence understanding. Thus, the epistemophilic instinct emerges from frustration and anxiety. (For a thoughtful discussion on the difficulties of this term and its links to Klein's notion of an early Oedipal complex, see Petot 1990, 190–196.)

10. Ricardo Steiner's (1985, 55) discussion on how psychoanalytic research differs from other forms of human studies is quite clear on this point: "Psychoanalytical discussion and development aim to provide a better understanding of the affective and phantasmatic processes which lie at the root of neurotic and psychotic disturbances. They are also concerned with understanding these problems as they appear amongst researchers who are concerned with them."

11. Nancy Chodorow's (1999) discussion of a psychoanalytic orientation to anthropology offers a more complex consideration. She makes a compelling argument that there may be more similarity between certain forms of psychoanalysis and anthropology, provided that anthropologists use their feelings as a means of understanding and that culture as a concept allow for pre-discursive influence (See Chapters 5–6).

12. Hug-Hellmuth argued that children under the age of seven or eight were not ready for analysis. But even then, the analyst must understand the differences between child and adult analysis. She identified three differences: the child is not in analysis voluntarily but is brought by the parents; the child does not have a past to explore but is in the midst of the difficulties; and the child has no desire to change herself.

13. This title was eventually published in English as "Four Lectures on Child Analysis 1927[1926])" in Volume I of Anna Freud's collected writings.

14. Friedlander (1997, 57) describes the shift in Nazi policy in 1933 from economic boycott and destruction of Jewish businesses to attacks on culture:

On the evening of May 10 [1933], rituals of exorcism took place in most of the university cities and towns of Germany. More than twenty thousand books were burned in Berlin, and from two to three thousand in every other major German city. In Berlin a huge bonfire was lit in front of the Kroll Opera House, and Goebbels was one of the speakers. After the speeches, in the capital as in the other cities, slogans against the banned authors were chanted by the throng as poisonous books (by Karl Marx, Ferdinand Lassalle, Sigmund Freud, Maximilian Harden, and Kurt Tucholsky, among many others) were hurled, batch after batch, into the flames.

15. Pearl King reports that the following Berlin analysts who left for London in 1933: Paula Heimann, Heinz Foulkes, Kate Friedlander, Eva Rosenfeld, and Hans Thorner. The Freuds went into exile and left for London on June 6, 1938. On September 23, 1939, almost to the day that Britain declared war on Germany, Freud died. After war was declared, analysts who had lived in Germany but now resided in London were declared enemy aliens and were not allowed free travel beyond London. Also see Goggin and Goggin's (2001) description of the Berlin and Vienna Jewish analysts's exile.

indeed, the Freud/Klein Controversies could not have occurred in the Nazi take-over of German psychoanalysis because in Germany and Austria, absolute loyalty to the Nazi State defined the parameters of illness and health and, euphemistic language obscured genocidal policies, and discussion of Freud’s work was forbidden.

Bibliography


